Krannert School of Management
403 W. State Street
West Lafayette, IN 47907
NBER Program Affiliations:
NBER Affiliation: Research Associate
Institutional Affiliation: Purdue University
Information about this author at RePEc
NBER Working Papers and Publications
|May 2019||Business Groups and the Incorporation of Firm-specific Shocks into Stock Prices|
with , : w25908
In lower-income economies, stocks exhibit less idiosyncratic volatility and business groups are more prevalent. This study connects these two findings by showing that business group affiliated firms’ stock returns exhibit less idiosyncratic volatility than do the returns of otherwise similar unaffiliated firms. Global commodity price shocks are common shocks that contribute to firm-level idiosyncratic risk because they affect industries heterogeneously. Idiosyncratic components of commodity shocks are incorporated less into idiosyncratic returns of group affiliates than unaffiliated firms in the same industry and economy. Identification follows from difference-in-difference tests exploiting successful and matched-exogenously-failed control block transactions.
|February 2018||Death by Pokémon GO: The Economic and Human Cost of Using Apps While Driving|
with : w24308
Using police accident reports for Tippecanoe County, Indiana, and exploiting the introduction of the augmented reality game Pokémon GO as a natural experiment, we document a disproportionate increase in crashes and associated vehicular damage, injuries, and fatalities in the vicinity of locations where users can play the game while driving. We estimate the incremental county-wide cost of users playing Pokémon GO while driving to be in the range of $5.2 to $25.5 million over the 148 days following the introduction of the game. Extrapolating these estimates to nation-wide levels yields a total ranging from $2.0 to $7.3 billion.
|January 2017||Political Determinants of Competition in the Mobile Telecommunication Industry|
with : w23041
We study how political factors shape competition in the mobile telecommunication sector. We show that the way a government designs the rules of the game has an impact on concentration, competition, and prices. Pro-competition regulation reduces prices, but does not hurt quality of services or investments. More democratic governments tend to design more competitive rules, while more politically connected operators are able to distort the rules in their favor, restricting competition. Government intervention has large redistributive effects: U.S. consumers would gain $65bn a year if U.S. mobile service prices were in line with German ones and $44bn if they were in line with Danish ones.