2 Rue Andre Pascal
Institutional Affiliation: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System
NBER Working Papers and Publications
|February 2013||It Pays to Set the Menu: Mutual Fund Investment Options in 401(k) Plans|
with Veronika K. Pool, Clemens Sialm: w18764
This paper investigates whether mutual fund families acting as trustees of 401(k) plans display favoritism toward their own funds. Using a hand-collected dataset on retirement investment options, we show that poorly-performing funds are less likely to be removed from and more likely to be added to a 401(k) menu if they are affiliated with the plan trustee. We find no evidence that plan participants undo this affiliation bias through their investment choices. Finally, the subsequent performance of poorly-performing affiliated funds indicates that these trustee decisions are not information driven and are costly to retirement savers.
Published: Veronika K. Pool & Clemens Sialm & Irina Stefanescu, 2016. "It Pays to Set the Menu: Mutual Fund Investment Options in 401(k) Plans," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 71(4), pages 1779-1812, 08. citation courtesy of