Elias Albagli

Central Bank of Chile
Research Department

E-Mail: EmailAddress: hidden: you can email any NBER-related person as first underscore last at nber dot org
Institutional Affiliation: Central Bank of Chile

NBER Working Papers and Publications

May 2017Imperfect Financial Markets and Shareholder Incentives in Partial and General Equilibrium
with Christian Hellwig, Aleh Tsyvinski: w23419
We analyze the firm-level and aggregate consequences of equity market imperfections in the form of noisy information aggregation for corporate risk-taking and investment. Market imperfections cause controlling shareholders to invest too much in upside risks and too little in downside risks in an attempt to capture market rents. In partial equilibrium, these inefficiencies are particularly severe if upside risks are coupled with near constant returns to scale. In general equilibrium, the shareholders’ collective attempts to boost shareholder value of individual firms leads to a novel pecuniary externality that amplifies investment distortions with downside risks but offsets distortions with upside risks, thereby overturning the results from the partial equilibrium analysis. We consider poli...
January 2014Dynamic Dispersed Information and the Credit Spread Puzzle
with Christian Hellwig, Aleh Tsyvinski: w19788
We develop a dynamic nonlinear, noisy REE model of credit risk pricing under dispersed information that can theoretically and quantitatively account for the credit spread puzzle. The first contribution is a sharp analytical characterization of the dynamic REE equilibrium and its comparative statics. Second, we show that the nonlinearity of the bond payoff in the environment with dispersed information and limits to arbitrage leads to underpricing of corporate debt and to spreads that over-state the probability of default. This underpricing is most pronounced for high investment grade, short maturity bonds. Third, we calibrate to the empirical data on the belief dispersion and show that the model generates spreads that explain between 16 to 42% of the empirical values for 4-year high investm...
October 2011A Theory of Asset Pricing Based on Heterogeneous Information
with Christian Hellwig, Aleh Tsyvinski: w17548
We propose a theory of asset prices that emphasizes heterogeneous information as the main element determining prices of different securities. Our main analytical innovation is in formulating a model of noisy information aggregation through asset prices, which is parsimonious and tractable, yet flexible in the specification of cash flow risks. We show that the noisy aggregation of heterogeneous investor beliefs drives a systematic wedge between the impact of fundamentals on an asset price, and the corresponding impact on cash flow expectations. The key intuition behind the wedge is that the identity of the marginal trader has to shift for different realization of the underlying shocks to satisfy the market-clearing condition. This identity shift amplifies the impact of price on the marginal...
August 2011Information Aggregation, Investment, and Managerial Incentives
with Christian Hellwig, Aleh Tsyvinski: w17330
We study the interplay of share prices and firm decisions when share prices aggregate and convey noisy information about fundamentals to investors and managers. First, we show that the informational feedback between the firm's share price and its investment decisions leads to a systematic premium in the firm's share price relative to expected dividends. Noisy information aggregation leads to excess price volatility, over-valuation of shares in response to good news, and undervaluation in response to bad news. By optimally increasing its exposure to fundamental risks when the market price conveys good news, the firm shifts its dividend risk to the upside, which amplifies the overvaluation and explains the premium. Second, we argue that explicitly linking managerial compensation to share pri...
NBER Videos

National Bureau of Economic Research, 1050 Massachusetts Ave., Cambridge, MA 02138; 617-868-3900; email:

Contact Us