University of Pennsylvania
2000 Steinberg-Dietrich Hall
Philadelphia, PA 19104
Institutional Affiliation: University of Pennsylvania
NBER Working Papers and Publications
|December 2013||Dynamic Commercialization Strategies for Disruptive Technologies: Evidence from the Speech Recognition Industry|
with Matt Marx, Joshua S. Gans: w19764
When startup innovation involves a potentially disruptive technology - initially lagging in the predominant performance metric, but with a potentially favorable trajectory of improvement - incumbents may be wary of engaging in cooperative commercialization with the startup. While the prevailing theory of disruptive innovation suggests that this will lead to (exclusively) competitive commercialization and the eventual replacement of incumbents, we consider a dynamic strategy involving product market entry before switching to a cooperative commercialization strategy. Empirical evidence from the automated speech recognition industry from 1952-2010 confirms the main prediction of the model.
Published: “Dynamic Commercialization Strategies for Disruptive Technologies: Evidence from the Speech Recognition Industry,” (with Matt Marx and David Hsu), Management Science, Vol.60, No.12, 2014, pp.3103-3123. citation courtesy of
|June 2012||Unobserved Heterogeneity in Matching Games with an Application to Venture Capital|
with Jeremy T. Fox, Chenyu Yang: w18168
Agents in two-sided matching games vary in characteristics that are unobservable in typical data on matching markets. We investigate the identification of the distribution of unobserved characteristics using data on who matches with whom. In full generality, we consider many-to-many matching and matching with trades. The distribution of match-specific unobservables cannot be fully recovered without information on unmatched agents, but the distribution of a combination of unobservables, which we call unobserved complementarities, can be identified. Using data on unmatched agents restores identification. We estimate the contribution of observables and unobservable complementarities to match production in venture capital investments in biotechnology and medical firms.
|July 2007||The Impact of Uncertain Intellectual Property Rights on the Market For Ideas: Evidence From Patent Grant Delays|
with Joshua S. Gans, Scott Stern: w13234
This paper considers the impact of the intellectual property (IP) system on the timing of cooperation/licensing by start-up technology entrepreneurs. If the market for technology licenses is efficient, the timing of licensing is independent of whether IP has already been granted. In contrast, the need to disclosure complementary (yet unprotected) knowledge, asymmetric information, or search costs may retard efficient technology transfer. In these cases, reductions in uncertainty surrounding the scope and extent of IP rights may facilitate trade in the market for ideas. We employ a dataset combining information about cooperative licensing and the timing of patent allowances (the administrative event when patent rights are clarified). While pre-allowance licensing does occur, the hazard rat...
Published: Joshua S. Gans & David H. Hsu & Scott Stern, 2008. "The Impact of Uncertain Intellectual Property Rights on the Market for Ideas: Evidence from Patent Grant Delays," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 54(5), pages 982-997, May. citation courtesy of
|August 2000||When Does Start-Up Innovation Spur the Gale of Creative Destruction?|
with Joshua S. Gans, Scott Stern: w7851
This paper is motivated by the substantial differences in start-up commercialization strategies observed across different high-technology sectors. Specifically, we evaluate the conditions under which start-up innovators earn their returns on innovation through product market competition with more established firms (such as in many areas of the electronics industry) as opposed to cooperation with these incumbents (either through licensing, strategic alliances or outright acquisition as observed in the pharmaceutical industry). While the former strategy challenges incumbent market power, the latter strategy tends to reinforce current market structure. Though the benefits of cooperation include forestalling the costs of competition in the product market and avoiding duplicative investment ...
Published: Joshua S. Gans & David H. Hsu & Scott Stern, 2002. "When Does Start-Up Innovation Spur the Gale of Creative Destruction?," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 33(4), pages 571-586, Winter. citation courtesy of