Propping Up the Wage Floor: Collective Labor Supply without Unions

Online Appendices

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XII Appendix Tables

TABLE A.I: Survey Attrition and Untreated Holdout Sample Composition

	(1) Has Endline Survey	(2) Num Control in Village
Wage cut: Public	0.0342	0.407
	(0.0514)	(0.376)
	[0.506]	[0.280]
Wage cut: Employer	0.0124	0.104
	(0.0525)	(0.355)
	[0.813]	[0.770]
Prevailing wage: Private	0.0383	-0.154
	(0.0525)	(0.397)
	[0.467]	[0.698]
Prevailing wage: Public	-0.0857	0.214
	(0.0662)	(0.433)
	[0.197]	[0.621]
Prevailing wage: Employer	0.0696	0.834
	(0.0554)	(0.486)
	[0.211]	[0.0876]
Observations	502	502
Task and Year x Month FE	✓	✓
Sample	All Workers	All Workers
Dep Var Mean (Wage cut: Private)	0.879	5.364

Notes: This table reports survey attrition and untreated holdout sample composition by treatment arm. Col. (1) reports the likelihood of successfully completing an exit survey with a member of the main experimental sample, by treatment. Col. (2) reports the number of untreated holdout sample surveys conducted in each village. In all columns, the omitted category is the Wage cut: Private treatment. All specifications include Year X Month and task fixed effects. Observations are weighted by the number of experimental subjects in each village. Standard errors are clustered at the village level and are reported in parentheses. P-values are reported in brackets.

TABLE A.II: Main Results With Randomization Inference

	(1) Worked	(2) Worked	(3) Worked
Wage cut: Public	-0.122	-0.136	-0.246
	[0.035]	[0.032]	[0]
Wage cut: Employer	-0.0657	-0.0516	-0.0758
	[0.346]	[0.448]	[0.349]
Prevailing wage: Private	0.0609	0.0791	0.0663
	[0.414]	[0.334]	[0.413]
Prevailing wage: Public	0.119	0.116	0.104
	[0.157]	[0.191]	[0.272]
Prevailing wage: Employer	0.0364	0.0690	0.0935
	[0.687]	[0.538]	[0.309]
Observations	502	502	363
Task and Year x Month FE		✓	✓
Sample	All Workers	All Workers	Agri. workers
Dep Var Mean (Wage cut: Private)	0.175	0.175	0.211
Test Prevailing wage: Private = Prevailing wage: Public	0.505	0.637	0.621
Test Wage cut: Employer = Wage cut: Public	0.124	0.107	0.012
Test Prevailing wage: Employer = Prevailing wage: Public	0.439	0.646	0.930
Test Prevailing wage: All = Wage cut: Private	0.195	0.137	0.244

Notes: This table presents our main specifications from Table II with p-values based on randomization inference. Randomization inference p-values are reported in square brackets below each coefficient, and at the bottom of the table for relevant tests. Inference for the coefficients was carried out with 1000 permutations of treatments (at the village level), permuting over the treatment of interest and the omitted treatment, the Wage Cut: Private category.

TABLE A.III: Main Results: Robustness to Controls For Imbalance

	(1) Worked	(2) Worked
Wage cut: Public	-0.177	-0.243
	(0.0634)	(0.0644)
	[0.00588]	[0.000230]
Wage cut: Employer	-0.0934	-0.101
	(0.0691)	(0.0760)
	[0.178]	[0.187]
Prevailing wage: Private	0.0224	0.0320
	(0.0708)	(0.0760)
	[0.752]	[0.674]
Prevailing wage: Public	0.0881	0.0908
	(0.0779)	(0.0859)
	[0.260]	[0.292]
Prevailing wage: Employer	0.0407	0.0796
	(0.0924)	(0.0966)
	[0.660]	[0.411]
Observations	427	350
Task and Year x Month FE	✓	✓
Sample	All Workers	Agri. Workers
Dep Var Mean (Wage cut: Private)	0.205	0.216
Test Prevailing wage: Private = Prevailing wage: Public	0.372	0.482
Test Wage cut: Private - Public = Prev. wage: Private - Public	0.0141	0.00476
Test Wage cut: Employer = Wage cut: Public	0.140	0.0328
Test Prev. wage: Private = Employer = Public	0.663	0.763
Test Prevailing wage: Employer = Prevailing wage: Public	0.619	0.913

Notes: This table presents results from our primary specification, with controls for variables imbalanced across treatments, as a robustness check. In all specifications, the dependent variable is an indicator for whether the worker accepted the job and worked for the employer. All specifications include controls for participating in the non-agricultural casual labor market and number of days employed for a wage in the past 30 (our measure of individual employment). In all columns, the omitted category is the Wage cut: Private treatment. All specifications include Year X Month and task fixed effects. Col. (1) includes the full sample. Col. (2) restricts the sample to workers who indicated in the exit survey that they engage in agricultural labor as a primary or secondary occupation. Observations are weighted by the number of experimental subjects in each village. Standard errors are clustered at the village level and are reported in parentheses. P-values are reported in brackets.

TABLE A.IV: Main Results: Sample Robustness

	(1) Worked	(2) Worked	(3) Accepted Offer
Wage cut: Public	-0.126	-0.122	-0.0817
	(0.0820)	(0.0645)	(0.0474)
	[0.127]	[0.0611]	[0.0869]
Wage cut: Employer	0.0260	-0.0374	-0.0377
	(0.0911)	(0.0702)	(0.0493)
	[0.775]	[0.595]	[0.445]
Prevailing wage: Private	0.0664	0.0788	0.0598
	(0.100)	(0.0754)	(0.0598)
	[0.508]	[0.297]	[0.318]
Prevailing wage: Public	0.136	0.0966	0.0793
	(0.102)	(0.0776)	(0.0514)
	[0.183]	[0.215]	[0.125]
Prevailing wage: Employer	0.126	0.137	0.0629
	(0.131)	(0.105)	(0.0746)
	[0.335]	[0.197]	[0.400]
Observations	188	359	545
Sample Restriction	First HH	First Two HHs	Intended Sample
Task and Year x Month FE	✓	✓	✓
Dep Var Mean (Wage cut: Private)	0.158	0.173	0.213
Test Prevailing wage: Private = Prevailing wage: Public	0.506	0.824	0.725
Test Wage cut: Private - Public = Prev. wage: Private - Public	0.139	0.171	0.170
Test Wage cut: Employer = Wage cut: Public	0.0628	0.161	0.241

Notes: This table presents results from our primary specification, restricted to various samples as a robustness check. In all specifications, the dependent variable is an indicator for whether the worker accepted the job and worked for the employer. In all columns, the omitted category is the Wage cut: Private treatment. All specifications include Year X Month and task fixed effects. In Col. (1), the sample is restricted to the first household approached in each village, and in Col. (2), the sample is restricted to the first two households approached in each village. In Col. (3), the sample is restricted to the intended main experimental sample households in the village, including households where no respondent was home. In these cases, we code the outcome variable "Accepted Job" as 0 (job refusal). Observations are weighted by the number of experimental subjects in each village. Standard errors are clustered at the village level and are reported in parentheses. P-values are reported in brackets.

TABLE A.V: Heterogeneous Treatment Effects: Individual Unemployment History

	(1) Worked	(2) Worked	(3) Worked	(4) Worked	(5) Worked	(6) Worked
Wage cut: Public	-0.196	-0.372	-0.213	-0.287	-0.298	-0.436
	(0.0664)	(0.0792)	(0.0742)	(0.0693)	(0.0880)	(0.0839)
	[0.00354]	[5.24e-06]	[0.00463]	[5.36e-05]	[0.000877]	[5.84e-07]
Prevailing wage (pooled)	0.0712	0.0192	0.133	0.124	0.0735	0.0313
	(0.0645)	(0.0773)	(0.0693)	(0.0798)	(0.0761)	(0.0889)
	[0.271]	[0.804]	[0.0575]	[0.123]	[0.336]	[0.725]
Low Village Unemployment	-0.166	-0.231			-0.192	-0.238
	(0.0699)	(0.0875)			(0.0733)	(0.0850)
	[0.0187]	[0.00895]			[0.00950]	[0.00576]
Wage cut: Public x Low Village Unemployment	0.160	0.355			0.200	0.358
	(0.0909)	(0.116)			(0.0989)	(0.114)
	[0.0808]	[0.00252]			[0.0449]	[0.00201]
Prevailing wage (pooled) x Low Village Unemployment	0.0780	0.205			0.134	0.198
	(0.0948)	(0.124)			(0.104)	(0.125)
	[0.412]	[0.101]			[0.201]	[0.114]
Low Individual Unemployment			-0.0901	-0.0988	-0.0822	-0.0892
			(0.0500)	(0.0605)	(0.0484)	(0.0557)
			[0.0734]	[0.105]	[0.0912]	[0.111]
Wage cut: Public x Low Individual Unemployment			0.132	0.154	0.119	0.140
			(0.0711)	(0.0685)	(0.0706)	(0.0687)
			[0.0648]	[0.0262]	[0.0927]	[0.0426]
Prevailing wage (pooled) x Low Individual Unemployment			-0.00102	0.0310	-0.0144	0.0193
			(0.0752)	(0.0877)	(0.0753)	(0.0846)
			[0.989]	[0.724]	[0.849]	[0.819]
Observations	493	363	427	350	427	350
Sample	All Workers	Agri. Workers	All Workers	Agri. Workers	All Workers	Agri. Workers
Task and Year x Month FE	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Dep Var Mean (Wage cut: Private, High unempl.)	0.333	0.393	0.262	0.282	0.262	0.282
Take-up Wage cut: Public, High unempl.	0.0611	0	0.0882	0.0370		
Take-up Wage cut: Public, Low unempl.	0.0308	0.0444	0.0500	0.0217		
Test Wage cut: Public, High - Low unempl.	0.928	0.114	0.474	0.165		

Notes: This table presents heterogeneous treatment effects by individual and village unemployment. Low village unemployment (Cols. (1), (2), (5), and (6)) is defined as an indicator for below-median unemployment at the village level. Unemployment is measured as the number of days in the 10-day recall that the respondent reports preferring work at the prevailing wage to their actual timeuse on that day. Only the untreated holdout sample surveys are used in the village-level measure. Low individual unemployment (Cols. (3)-(6)) is defined as below-median days in the past 30 that the worker reports wanting work but is unable to find any, as measured in the worker exit survey. In all specifications, the dependent variable is an indicator for whether the worker accepted the job and worked for the employer. In all specifications, the omitted category is the Wage cut: Private treatment for the workers with high (individual or village or both) unemployment. All specifications include Year X Month and task fixed effects. Cols. (1), (3), and (5) include the full sample. Cols. (2), (4), and (6) restrict the sample to workers who indicated in the exit survey that they engage in agricultural labor as a primary or secondary occupation. Observations are weighted by the number of experimental subjects in each village. Standard errors are clustered at the village level and are reported in parentheses. P-values are reported in brackets.

TABLE A.VI: Heterogeneous Treatment Effects: Experience with the Hiring Employer

	(1) Worked	(2) Worked
Wage cut: Public	-0.202	-0.239
	(0.0708)	(0.0778)
	[0.00478]	[0.00249]
Wage cut: Employer	-0.110	-0.103
	(0.0790)	(0.0953)
	[0.166]	[0.284]
Prevailing wage (pooled)	0.0232	0.0376
	(0.0794)	(0.0880)
	[0.771]	[0.670]
Wage cut: Public x Employer Experience	0.0636	-0.0184
	(0.111)	(0.118)
	[0.566]	[0.876]
Wage cut: Employer x Employer Experience	0.0494	0.00161
	(0.119)	(0.143)
	[0.679]	[0.991]
Prevailing wage (pooled) x Employer Experience	0.140	0.107
	(0.123)	(0.135)
	[0.254]	[0.430]
High Employer Experience	-0.0206	0.0193
	(0.0966)	(0.108)
	[0.832]	[0.858]
Observations	426	350
Task and Year x Month FE	✓	✓
Sample	All Workers	Agri. Workers
Test Wage cut: Public + Public x Experience = 0	0.163	0.0105
Test Wage cut: Employer + Employer x Experience = 0	0.557	0.395
Test Wage cut: Pub. + Pub. x Exp. = Wage cut: Empl. + Empl. x Exp.	0.316	0.0725
Dep Var Mean (Omitted)	0.183	0.188

Notes: This table presents heterogeneous treatment effects by previous work experience with the participating employer, as measured in the worker exit survey. In all specifications, we define the heterogeneous variable of interest, "high employer experience", to be an indicator for the worker having ever worked for the hiring employer in the past. In all specifications, the dependent variable is an indicator for whether the worker accepted the job and worked for the employer. In all columns, the omitted category is the Wage cut: Private pooled treatment for the low employer experience group only. All specifications include Year X Month and task fixed effects. Col. (2) restricts the sample to workers who indicated in the exit survey that they engage in agricultural labor as a primary or secondary occupation. Observations are weighted by the number of experimental subjects in each village. Standard errors are clustered at the village level and are reported in parentheses. P-values are reported in brackets.

TABLE A.VII: Wages, amenities, and worker quality and selection on the day of work

	(1) Received vs. Offered Cash Wage (%)	(2) Length of work (mins)	(3) Number of meals included	(4) Hired before	(5) Work day rating	(6) Work day rating
Wage Cut	0.0243	-2.863	-0.280	-0.207	0.0206	0.0469
	(0.0259)	(16.91)	(0.291)	(0.195)	(0.297)	(0.402)
	[0.354]	[0.866]	[0.340]	[0.294]	[0.945]	[0.908]
Observations	70	74	74	77	74	61
Task and Year x Month FE	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Dep Var Mean (Omitted)	0	313.3	0.690	0.652	1.178	1.178

Notes: This table presents statistics on job amenities, and worker selection and quality on the day of work. The dependent variable in Col. (1) is the percent difference between the total cash wage received (including any side transfers) and the offered wage. Total cash wage received, length of the work day (Col. (2)), and meals received from the employer (Col. (3)) are measured in the exit survey. Workers' prior experience with employer is measured by an indicator for having been hired before by the employer (Col. (4)), and is also collected in the exit survey. Worker quality (Cols. (5) and (6)) is reported for the day of work on a rating scale of 1-4 by the employer. In all specifications, the omitted category is Prevailing wage (Pooled). All specifications include Year X Month and task fixed effects. The sample is restricted to all workers who came to the job on the day of work. Cols. (1)-(5) consider the full sample of workers, while in Col (6) we only consider the *Private* $w - 10\%$ treatment compared against all of the w treatments. Standard errors are clustered at the village level and reported in parentheses. P-values are presented in brackets.

TABLE A.VIII: Exit Survey Reports of Village Prevailing Wage

	(1) 1(Agree)	(2) Difference	(3) Abs. Difference
Wage cut: Public	0.0442	-1.126	-1.291
	(0.0713)	(3.246)	(3.051)
	[0.536]	[0.729]	[0.673]
Wage cut: Employer	0.0333	-1.900	-1.266
	(0.0841)	(4.011)	(3.557)
	[0.692]	[0.636]	[0.722]
Prevailing wage: Private	0.123	-1.598	-2.557
	(0.0771)	(4.109)	(3.718)
	[0.112]	[0.698]	[0.493]
Prevailing wage: Public	0.0579	2.640	-0.109
	(0.0856)	(4.505)	(4.084)
	[0.499]	[0.559]	[0.979]
Prevailing wage: Employer	0.122	-0.675	-3.194
	(0.0918)	(6.082)	(4.805)
	[0.185]	[0.912]	[0.507]
Observations	431	431	431
Task and Year x Month FE	✓	✓	✓
Dep Var Mean	0.800	5.650	8.875
Test Wage cut: Private = Wage cut: Public	0.536	0.729	0.673
Test Prevailing wage: Private = Prevailing wage: Public	0.399	0.369	0.561

Notes: This table presents statistics on the accuracy of the worker census participant's *ex-ante* report of the prevailing wage, relative to respondents' *ex-post* reports in the exit survey. In Col. (1), the dependent variable is an indicator for whether the respondent reports the same prevailing wage in the exit survey as the village worker census participant reported prior to the intervention. In Col. (2), the dependent variable is the difference between the respondent's view of the prevailing wage and the worker census participant's report. In Col. (3), the dependent variable is the absolute value of this difference. In all columns, the omitted category is the Wage cut: Private treatment. All specifications include Year X Month and task fixed effects. The sample is restricted to all experimental sample workers who responded to our exit survey. Standard errors are clustered at the village level and are reported in parentheses. P-values are reported in brackets.

TABLE A.IX: Robustness of Wage Rigidity Results to Definition of Low Worker Cohesion

	Proxy for Low Worker Cohesion									
	Wage Labor: Caste Herfindahl					*Agri Labor Force: Caste Herfindahl*				
	Below median	Below median	Linear	Linear in ranks	Bottom tercile	Below median	Below median	Linear	Linear in ranks	Bottom tercile
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)
Panel A - Dependent variable: Log Agricultural Wage										
Positive shock last year	0.102	0.110	0.0580	0.0601	0.0480	0.0971	0.106	0.0662	0.0565	0.0583
	(0.042)	(0.042)	(0.023)	(0.023)	(0.037)	(0.033)	(0.033)	(0.027)	(0.022)	(0.032)
Positive shock last year	-0.0826	-0.0821	-0.208	-0.112	-0.0319	-0.0899	-0.0898	-0.183	-0.110	-0.0443
x Low worker cohesion	(0.050)	(0.050)	(0.141)	(0.071)	(0.047)	(0.038)	(0.038)	(0.145)	(0.066)	(0.042)
Positive shock this year	0.0800	0.0910	0.0569	0.0639	0.0540	0.0751	0.0870	0.0531	0.0653	0.0503
	(0.038)	(0.038)	(0.021)	(0.024)	(0.063)	(0.039)	(0.039)	(0.028)	(0.022)	(0.054)
Positive shock this year	-0.0242	-0.0273	0.138	-0.00253	0.0195	-0.0181	-0.0221	0.107	-0.0155	-0.000865
x Low worker cohesion	(0.042)	(0.041)	(0.169)	(0.075)	(0.068)	(0.043)	(0.043)	(0.181)	(0.072)	(0.056)
Observations (worker-days)	59243	59243	59243	59243	59243	59243	59243	59243	59243	59243
Panel B - Dependent variable: Agricultural Employment										
Positive shock last year	-0.234	-0.269	-0.133	-0.142	-0.183	-0.172	-0.206	-0.160	-0.143	-0.223
	(0.078)	(0.079)	(0.055)	(0.056)	(0.114)	(0.080)	(0.083)	(0.063)	(0.055)	(0.087)
Positive shock last year	0.189	0.193	0.429	0.387	0.259	0.0716	0.0766	0.358	0.311	0.180
x Low worker cohesion	(0.088)	(0.089)	(0.331)	(0.183)	(0.135)	(0.107)	(0.109)	(0.448)	(0.201)	(0.122)
Positive shock this year	0.133	0.0860	0.158	0.147	0.235	0.131	0.0853	0.127	0.145	0.124
	(0.083)	(0.089)	(0.062)	(0.062)	(0.129)	(0.091)	(0.098)	(0.075)	(0.061)	(0.122)
Positive shock this year	0.0394	0.0420	-0.142	0.135	0.0675	0.0469	0.0503	0.394	0.246	0.137
x Low worker cohesion	(0.114)	(0.115)	(0.496)	(0.231)	(0.162)	(0.123)	(0.123)	(0.600)	(0.243)	(0.162)
Observations (workers)	623861	623861	623861	623861	623861	631909	631909	631909	631909	631909

Notes: This table presents the sensitivity of the wage rigidity tests in Table VII to varying the definition of low social cohesion. Sample, variable definitions, and controls are as in Table VII. Cols. (1) and (6) replicate the results from the main table in the paper. Cols. (2) and (7) add controls for a longer history of lagged positive shocks (2 and 3 years ago) to the main specifications. The definitions of worker cohesion in the remaining columns are as follows. Cols. (3) and (8): linear control for the district Caste Herfindahl index (reversed so that a higher value means less cohesion). Cols (4) and (9): linear control for the rank of the district's Caste Herfindahl index (reversed so that a higher value means less cohesion). Cols (5) and (10): An indicator for the worker's district being in the bottom tercile by caste Herfindahl index (compared to omitted category of top tercile). Standard errors are clustered by region-year and reported in parentheses.

TABLE A.X: Surplus Estimation Sensitivity Analysis

Labor Supply in the Competitive Equilibrium, L*				
LS Elasticity (Rows)/LD Elasticity(Columns)	**0.5**	**1**	**2**	**4**
0.5	0.24	0.26	0.28	0.30
1	0.23	0.24	0.26	0.28
2	0.22	0.23	0.24	0.26
4	0.21	0.22	0.23	0.24

Wage in the Competitive Equilibrium, W*				
LS Elasticity (Rows)/LD Elasticity(Columns)	**0.5**	**1**	**2**	**4**
0.5	110.26	135.34	158.52	175.84
1	144.33	155.13	167.67	179.26
2	168.36	172.17	177.56	183.83
4	183.02	184.18	186.08	188.78

Total Surplus in Competitive Equilibrium				
LS Elasticity (Rows)/LD Elasticity(Columns)	**0.5**	**1**	**2**	**4**
0.5	97.95	79.40	70.74	66.74
1	68.35	48.97	39.70	35.37
2	53.95	34.17	24.49	19.85
4	46.91	26.98	17.09	12.24

Deadweight Loss in Surplus Under Wage Floor Equilibrium, W				
LS Elasticity (Rows)/LD Elasticity(Columns)	**0.5**	**1**	**2**	**4**
0.5	3.29	4.74	6.08	7.08
1	1.02	1.64	2.37	3.04
2	0.29	0.51	0.82	1.18
4	0.08	0.14	0.26	0.41

Percent Increase in Worker Surplus Under Wage Floor Equilibrium, W				
LS Elasticity (Rows)/LD Elasticity(Columns)	**0.5**	**1**	**2**	**4**
0.5	43.89%	23.17%	7.76%	-1.94%
1	66.22%	43.89%	23.17%	7.76%
2	85.24%	66.22%	43.89%	23.17%
4	98.49%	85.24%	66.22%	43.89%

Notes: This table presents various outcomes of interest in our surplus calculations for a range of labor demand and supply elasticities. We consider labor supply and the wage under the competitive equilibrium, deadweight loss under the wage floor equilibrium, and worker and employer surplus under both equilibria. The level of labor demand at the prevailing wage is based on survey evidence collected as part of a labor market rationing experiment by Breza et al. (2019), set in 64 other villages in the same districts of Odisha as this experiment.

TABLE A.XI: Surplus Estimation Sensitivity Under Inefficient Rationing

Labor Supply in the Competitive Equilibrium, L* (Identical to Efficient Rationing)

LS Elasticity (Rows)/LD Elasticity(Columns)	**0.5**	**1**	**2**	**4**
0.5	0.24	0.26	0.28	0.30
1	0.23	0.24	0.26	0.28
2	0.22	0.23	0.24	0.26
4	0.21	0.22	0.23	0.24

Wage in the Competitive Equilibrium, W* (Identical to Efficient Rationing)

LS Elasticity (Rows)/LD Elasticity(Columns)	**0.5**	**1**	**2**	**4**
0.5	110.26	135.34	158.52	175.84
1	144.33	155.13	167.67	179.26
2	168.36	172.17	177.56	183.83
4	183.02	184.18	186.08	188.78

Total Surplus in Competitive Equilibrium (Identical to Efficient Rationing)

LS Elasticity (Rows)/LD Elasticity(Columns)	**0.5**	**1**	**2**	**4**
0.5	97.95	79.40	70.74	66.74
1	68.35	48.97	39.70	35.37
2	53.95	34.17	24.49	19.85
4	46.91	26.98	17.09	12.24

Deadweight Loss in Surplus Under Wage Floor Equilibrium, W, and Inefficient Rationing

LS Elasticity (Rows)/LD Elasticity(Columns)	**0.5**	**1**	**2**	**4**
0.5	10.17	14.66	18.81	21.91
1	4.55	7.33	10.56	13.55
2	2.08	3.66	5.91	8.51
4	0.98	1.83	3.22	5.20

Percent Increase in Worker Surplus Under Wage Floor Equilibrium, W

LS Elasticity (Rows)/LD Elasticity(Columns)	**0.5**	**1**	**2**	**4**
0.5	25.77%	0.82%	-17.33%	-28.54%
1	44.77%	13.96%	-13.75%	-33.69%
2	60.93%	27.84%	-9.67%	-42.90%
4	72.18%	39.49%	-6.01%	-56.92%

Notes: This table presents various outcomes of interest in our surplus calculations for a range of labor demand and supply elasticities under inefficient rationing. The outcomes of interest include labor supply and wage under the competitive equilibrium, deadweight loss under the wage floor equilibrium, and worker and employer surplus under both equilibria. Here, we assume "inefficient rationing" of jobs in the following sense: workers with the highest potential surplus from the jobs are rationed out of the market in the wage floor equilibrium.

XIII Appendix Figures



Figure B.I: Collective Action: Wage Setting in the Village

Notes: This figure graphs responses to two survey questions about collective action in wage-setting within the village. Data are from the sample of untreated holdout sample households from experiment villages surveyed following the completion of the experiment. Data are from N = 584 male casual workers in 183 villages.



FIGURE B.II: Worker Beliefs: Impacts of Accepting Wage Cuts

Notes: This figure graphs responses to three survey questions about employer and worker responses to a worker accepting a job at below the prevailing wage. Data from Kaur (2019), from N = 196 male casual workers in 34 villages across 6 districts in the states of Odisha and Madhya Pradesh.



(a) Punishment across Scenarios



(b) Punishment Amounts

FIGURE B.III: Laboratory Games: All Scenarios

Notes: This figure shows responses in the costly punishment game by N=131 lab game participants (players) to various scenarios about the behavior of the anonymous partner. Panel A shows the proportion of times players punished their anonymous partners under 4 different scenarios about partner behavior: (i) A villager who gave a gift of a bag of grain when it was needed; (ii) A worker who accepted a job at the prevailing wage (pooled across partners in own and other villages); (iii) A worker who accepted a job at 10% below the prevailing wage (pooled again across own and other villages); (iv) A farmer who hired a worker two months ago but still has not paid him. Panel B shows the amount (in rupees, out of a maximum possible of Rs. 100) deducted from the partner's payoff under scenarios (iii) and (iv), unconditional and conditional on punishment.



(a) Positive Wage Labor Force: Caste Herfindahl



(b) Agri Wage Labor Force: Caste Herfindahl

FIGURE B.IV: Kernel Density of Caste Herfindahl Measures

Notes: This figure shows the distribution of the Herfindahl index of caste across districts for a) all workers who report any daily agricultural labor for a wage, and b) for all workers who report agricultural labor as their primary or secondary occupation. Data are from the National Sample Survey data (1986-2007).



(a) Competitive Equilibrium (b) Wage Floor, Inefficient Rationing

FIGURE B.V: Equilibrium wages and employment under the competitive equilibrium and under inefficient rationing.

XIV Hiring Script

The following is representative of the hiring script that was used across all experimental rounds:

Employer: I have some work on my field for which I'd like to hire you for one day. The work is _____ *[insert specific task]* on my field for one day on _____ *[insert the date for the work]*. The other details will be given to you by them. *[Employer indicates for the enumerator to take over the dialogue.]*

(For private treatment only, employer steps away with the second enumerator out of earshot).

Enumerator: You will get _____ *[insert wage here]* for this work. The employer needs three people for this task on _____ *[employer name]*'s field on _____ *[scheduled day]*. This job is being offered to you and two others in this hamlet for this task.

(For private treatment only) We will not inform anyone else how much you have been offered for this job. Only you will know your wage (the employer will not know it).

Do you understand? Whether or not you want to take this job is fine.

Employer rejoins the conversation

Employer: Would you like to take the job?

If laborer rejects: Why? *[After the respondent has given a reason, skip to the questions]*

If laborer accepts: Be ready to work in the morning at _____ AM, in the morning i.e. half an hour before the work starts. The work will happen at _____ *[insert location of the employer's farm/field]*.

Enumerator: We have a few questions about agriculture to ask you related to our study. Would you be able to answer them?
1. For one acre land, what is the optimal number of laborers required for land levelling?
2. Post crop cutting, what is the total number of paddy straw bundles one laborer can get in one day?
3. How many paddy shoot bundles can one laborer pick in one day (contractual piece rate labor)?
4. When you go for daily wage labor, does the employer provide you with the farming tools or do you carry them along?

[For enumerator: Afterwards, record on a scale of 1-3 whether the person seemed engaged and knowledgeable in answering questions, with 1=not engaged/knowledgeable, and 3=very engaged/knowledgeable.]

Thank you for your time.