Online Appendix
Not For Publication

Liquidity Constraints in the U.S. Housing Market

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Contents

This appendix describes in great detail the datasets and procedures that we have used to compute the moments and the assigned parameters in our paper. It also provides more details on the robustness checks that were included in the main text, as well as some further evidence on issues that were only briefly discussed in the main text.

1 Income process

We use data from the *Single-year Family Files* of the Panel Study of Income Dynamics to estimate the parameters of the income process. Starting in 1999, the PSID waves are released at a biennial frequency. It's important to note that the year of release is not the year for which the data have been collected. For example, the PSID wave for 1999 would actually report income data for 1998. For each wave between 1999 and 2007, we use the nationally representative SRC sample of the PSID to create measures of annual income stemming from labor or transfers. For observations that are not reported at the annual level, we convert the income measures using additional information on the frequency with which each type of income is obtained. We drop observations for which the age, education and marital status of the head is not reported.

After constructing the income variables of interest, we use Taxsim to compute the tax liabilities of each household in our sample. We provide Taxsim with the state of residence for each household in order to get a measure of state taxes that households are liable for. Married household heads are assigned the joint filing status. Unmarried households that have children residing within the household are assigned a household head status in Taxsim. All the other households are considered filing separately. To compute household income before taxes, we specify in Taxsim the wages (net of pension contributions), social security income, taxable pension income, unemployment compensation, workers' compensation, supplemental social security, other welfare, child support, and transfers from relatives for both the head of the household and his/her spouse if married. After running Taxsim, we get a measure of state and federal taxes that we subtract from our measure of total pre-tax household income. We then adjust after-tax income for inflation using the CPI index, where the base year is 1998. Lastly, we apply the OECD equivalence scale to get our final measure of per capita deflated disposable income.

Next, we use the *Cross-year Individual File* of the PSID to generate an unique ID that combines the personal number of each individual ever surveyed in the PSID with the family identifier of the household in which this individual resides in a given year. We need to create this new ID because the *Single-year Family Files* used to compute our measure of disposable income don't record an identifier that could help us track the same household across different PSID waves. For each wave between 1999 and 2007, we keep only the household heads that are still living with their family and merge this data with data on disposable income that we computed earlier. We drop the observations for which the age of the head is inconsistent between the *Cross-year Individual File* and the *Single-year Family Files*. We also drop observations that are splitoffs, namely observations for which the household head moved in or out of the household during the year of survey. We do this in order to make sure that any changes in average household income don't come from households in which the head has changed between two years (i.e., we want to avoid cases in which family income dropped by 50% between two years just because the former head left the family after a divorce). We then pool all the waves together and drop the households that are inconsistent about the age and education of their head across consecutive PSID waves. This data filter guarantees that we keep track of the same household head and their household unit across time (e.g., age of head does not grow by more or less than two years between two survey waves). The result of pooling the waves together is a panel dataset that is used to compute the parameters of the income process required for our model.

We restrict our sample to households for which the household head is between 25 and 85 years old. We also ensure that our panel is balanced by focusing only on the households for which we have all observations for the 1999-2007 PSID waves. Lastly, when computing the variance of log income, the 2-and-4-year autocovariances, as well as the standard deviation of biannual income growth, we exclude the residuals for observations that we qualify as outliers. In this sense, we compute for each household the difference between observed log income and mean log income across time ($\Delta_{it} = \log(\text{income})_{it} - \overline{\log(\text{income})_i}$). When estimating the variance and the autocovariance we exclude the observations that are in the top and bottom percentile of the distribution of these differences (Δ_{it}).

2 Moments

Data from the Survey of Consumer Finances (SCF) is used to compute the majority of moments to which we calibrate our model, unless otherwise specified in the main text. The SCF data comes in two formats: (i) *Full Public Data Set* that contains all variables except for the private ones that could identify the reporting household, (ii) *Summary Extract Public Data* which consists of a sample of summary measures computed by the Federal Reserve Board Staff. We combine these two datasets for the purpose of this study, because some data needed to compute the moments used for calibration is not readily available in the *Summary Extract Public Data*.

Most of our moments have income as a common denominator. We compute disposable income using SCF data in a similar way we did for PSID data. Namely, we specify various income components from the Summary Extract Public Data file for each wave and run Taxsim in order to calculate the tax liabilities. We split household wage and business income in two unequal parts, awarding 75% of total income to the head of the household. We then assume that each of earners allocates 6% of their income towards pension contributions. Next, we use the reported measures for social security benefits as well as transfers to proxy for other incomes that the household receives every year. We run Taxsim and subtract the resulting federal tax from pre-tax income.[1] The final output of this routine is a measure of after-tax income. We also use the *Full Public Data Set* to compute the rent paid by households each year. Rent and the after tax income are then equivalized using the OECD equivalence scales.

Aside from income, our moments rely on some measure of household wealth (e.g., net worth, liquid assets, mortgage debt, etc.). Our measure of housing assets is based on the value of the primary residence alone. Mortgage debt is the sum of all mortgages on the primary residence (including home equity loans and outstanding balances on home equity lines of credit).[2] Housing net worth is the value of the primary residence less any mortgage debt on this residence. Liquid assets are the sum of checking accounts, saving accounts, money market deposits, money market mutual fund accounts, certificates of deposit, directly held pooled investment funds, saving bonds, stocks, other residential real estate assets net of mortgages, other non-financial assets, and net of credit card balances.[3] Each of these wealth statistics is equivalized using OECD equivalence scales. Lastly, we exclude households whose head is not aged between 25 and 85 years when computing the moments using SCF data, as well as households who have net worth above the 80th percentile of the net worth distribution. Net worth is computed by summing up housing net worth and liquid assets.

3 Secondary homes vs. primary residences

We chose to include other residential real estate in our measure of liquid assets, as opposed to having it be part of the housing assets, for the following reasons. First, as described in the main text, very few homeowners own a secondary home in the data and adding the secondary home to the housing wealth would change our moments by very little.[4] Second, and more importantly, according to the breakdown provided by National Association of Realtors (2014) secondary homes are very different in nature from primary residences:

- A buyer of a secondary home intends to keep it for a median duration of 5-to-6 years, as opposed to a duration of 8 years for buyers of primary residences. As a consequence,

[1]State taxes are not computed by Taxsim because SCF does not report in the publicly available files the state in which each household resides at the time of survey.

[2]We include the second lien loans in our calculations of mortgage debt in order to ensure that we capture all household debt. In the 2001 SCF data, second lien loans are held by households whose income is 1.5 times larger than the average income. These households also have a higher wealth relative to aggregate income when compared to all others (2.05 for those who have second liens vs. 1.45 for all households in the sample).

[3]Other non-financial assets include oil and gas leases, futures contracts, royalties, proceeds from lawsuits or estates in settlement, and loans made to others.

[4]In the 2001 SCF wave, only 11.3 percent of all families owned other residential properties aside from the primary residence, which represented 4.7 percent of the value of total assets.

the market for secondary residences should have a higher turnover rate.

- On average only 30 percent of secondary home sales are used as vacation properties, while the rest of the secondary home sales are used as investment properties that earn returns. Moreover, at least a quarter of the homeowners who own vacation homes purchase them with an intention to rent to others.
- Between 40 and 50 percent of secondary home owners use cash when purchasing such properties, while the ones who use mortgages finance a lower share of the purchase via debt than homeowners getting a mortgage to buy a primary residence. Furthermore, homeowners that own a secondary home also have higher incomes on average than owners of primary residences.

The arguments above support our conjecture that the market for secondary homes is different from the market for primary residences, and likely to be more liquid.

4 Returns on renting

In our benchmark calibration, we obtain a rental rate of 4.5%, close to the population weighted national average net rental yield of 4.3% reported by Eisfeldt and Demers (2018). These authors use data on large institutional investors to compute yields for rental investments. While institutional investors have different investment horizons compared to U.S. households and are subject to different borrowing constraints, it is encouraging to see that our rental rate is within the 2-10 percent interval obtained by Eisfeldt and Demers (2018).

5 Homeowners that rent out main residence

We use data from the SCF to show that very few homeowners in the U.S. rent out some part of their main residence. More specifically, we compute the ratio of homeowners who report renting out any portion of their house or lot/apartment/mobile home/building to others. In the 2001 sample, this ratio is equal to 2.8% of homeowners. Adding farm owners to this ratio doesn't change it significantly (ratio would increase to 3%).

6 Housing maintenance costs

To compute the distribution of housing maintenance costs, we use consumption data from the PSID. Unfortunately, home repair expenditures started being reported only in the 2005 wave of the survey and we have to rely on estimates from this year as it is the closest one to our benchmark (i.e., 2001). We calculate the ratio of home repair costs to self-reported home values from the PSID and use it to discipline the maintenance shock in our benchmark model. The median homeowner spends around 0.3% of the value of their home on repairs, while the 95 percentile spends 6.3%. To ensure that the 2005 values that we used are not capturing some abnormal patterns in the data, we computed the same ratio for later survey waves of the PSID (2013-2017). During this time period, the 95 percentile spend between 6.1% and 6.4% of their house value on home repairs, an interval around our 2005 target.

7 Forbearance programs

The academic literature on the magnitude of forbearance programs in the U.S. mortgage market is rather scarce. While most commercial banks have guidelines implementing such programs (as well as Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac), there is little evidence on how often these programs are used and how successful they are in curing delinquencies, especially for loan renegotiations prior to 2006. The scarce existing evidence presented below does however point to the fact that forbearance programs are rarely offered to delinquent borrowers.

Adelino et al. (2013) use a contract-change algorithm that compares the properties of a given loan across time to infer whether the loan was modified during 2006-2011. They find that in 2006 only 10000 loans per quarter were modifications (i.e. payment, interest or term have changed) in a dataset that covers 60 percent of the U.S. mortgage market. While their algorithm cannot identify forbearance programs clearly, the low number of modifications per quarter indicate that delinquent mortgage loans were rarely renegotiated before the crisis. They also explore changes in the payment size after loan modifications and find that in 2006, households that received payment reductions after modifications were getting only a 10 percent cut to their payments as a result of the modification (on average). This again highlights that very few households are getting significant payment relief even when they become delinquent on their loans and enter into renegotiation programs with loan providers/servicers.

Agarwal et al. (2011) is another study that relies on loan level data to track loan renegotiations. In contrast to Adelino et al. (2013), Agarwal et al. (2011) observe the renegotiation status reported by loan providers in their dataset. Hence they don't need to rely on any algorithm to track mortgages across time and give a more accurate breakdown of renegotiation arrangements by type. The downside is that they focus only on 2008-2009, a period when a lot of government mortgage assistance programs started being implemented. The big take-away for our purposes is that principal deferral were relatively rare (3 percent of all loan modifications). Term extensions were also a rare renegotiation status (about 15 percent of all loan modifications).

Moreover, when tracking renegotiated loans across time, they find that only 2.6 percent of delinquencies entered a repayment plan within the first 6 months after the start of their delinquency. After six more months, more than half of borrowers in their sample were in liquidation mode, about 23 percent of loans have been renegotiated, and about 25 percent had no action. This highlights, that even during a period with a high number of delinquencies, loan renegotiations were an infrequent solution.

The last piece of evidence that we reviewed comes from Orr et al. (2011). These authors study the effects of the Homeowners' Emergency Mortgage Assistance Program (HEMAP), a Pennsylvania state policy that provides forebearance programs to borrowers who become delinquent on their mortgages due to short unemployment spells or are subject to financial hardship beyond their control. HEMAP offers temporary loans so that households in need can keep current on their original loan until they get enough income to repay the HEMAP transition loan. This policy was introduced in 1983, and until 2009, 183 thousand borrowers applied for such a loan. Out of these, only 23 percent were approved for HEMAP. Around 80 percent of loan recipients have retained ownership of their residences, repaying the HEMAP loan and getting current on their old mortgage. Despite its success and being self-sustaining (borrowers pay interest on HEMAP loans), the state of Pennsylvania canceled this forbearance program in 2011.

8 Mortgage interest rate

We use data from three sources to set our real interest rate on mortgage debt. First, we obtain the average 30-year fixed mortgage rate for 2001 from the FRED database (6.97%). Second, we multiply this rate by (1-0.2391), where 23.91% is the average marginal tax subsidy on mortgage interest paid as reported by TAXSIM (federal plus state tax rate subsidy, value for 2002 reported at http://users.nber.org/~taxsim/marginal-tax-rates/at.html). Lastly, we subtract the 2001 percent change in CPI (2.8%) from the rate obtained above, to arrive at $6.97 \cdot (1 - 0.2391) - 2.8 = 2.5\%$. We obtained the average annual change in CPI from the FRED database (Consumer Price Index for All Urban Consumers: All Items).

9 Equity extraction

We use data from the PSID to compute a number of moments characterizing the equity extraction patterns of U.S. households. We construct a panel of households from the 1999 and 2001 waves of the survey and track how the total mortgage balance reported by homeowners changes between these two years. Total mortgage balance is the sum of remaining mortgage principals for two mortgages recorded in the PSID. If a households reports and increase in the total mortgage balance of 5 or more percent, as well as not selling a home between the two survey waves, we assign it an equity extraction status. This is meant to capture households that cash-out refinance in the data. The fraction of homeowners that extract equity is computed based on this assigned status. We also compute the median increase in total mortgage balance for those households that have extracted equity and the median change in their LTV ratio, which are based on self-reported house values. Lastly, following our definitions for liquid assets and wealth that we applied to the SCF data (summarized in Section 2), we calculate the average and median values for liquid assets, as well as liquid assets to wealth ratios, based on reported values prior to the refinancing decision (i.e., using only data for the 1999 survey wave).

10 Home equity of unemployed

To test how much unemployed and employed households differ in terms of their home equity, we compute the value of home equity recorded in the PSID for these two categories of households. Home equity is defined as the self-reported value of homes minus the total value of remaining mortgage debt. We assign the unemployment status to a given household in our sample if the head of the household or the spouse report being unemployed during any time of the survey year. Once this status is assigned, we calculate the ratio between home equity and house value. We find that these ratios don't differ substantially among the two groups of households. The 10th percentile of home equity to housing values is equal to 17% for the employed and 10% for the unemployed, while the median ratio is 63% for the employed and 45% for the unemployed.

11 Cost of refinancing and closing costs

The average closing costs typically range between 2 to 8 percent of the purchase price (see http://michaelbluejay.com/house/interest.html). These costs include lender-related costs, as well as property-associated expenses. Some of these costs are fixed amounts (e.g., appraisal, credit report, survey and title fees), while others are expressed in percentage terms of the original sale price or mortgage loan size (e.g. origination and insurance fees, property taxes, etc.).

Using the calculator in the link above, we can get a sense of how accurate our estimates of closing and refi costs are. The median sale price of houses sold in 2001 was 173,100 USD according to the FRED database. This would imply lender related costs of 5.2% of sale price or about 33% of average income (computed based on the 2001 SCF data used in our calibration exercise), as well as property related costs of 2.5% of the house price (or 16% of mean 2001 income). These numbers are somewhat higher than the ones assumed by Agarwal et al. (2013) (2000 USD + 1% of mortgage amount closing costs). Our estimates align closer to the ones in Agarwal et al. (2013) and are at the lower end of the parameter values and estimates provided by the Federal Reserve Board (see https://www.federalreserve.gov/pubs/refinancings//#cost).

12 Adjustment of the payment-to-income constraint

We describe the adjustment we performed to make the payment-to-income ratio in the model comparable to the data order to account for the fact that mortgage payments in our model do no include tax deductions and inflation, as well as to account for non-mortgage payments.

Let B be the dollar amount of the mortgage that the household has on its home. In the data the payment on such a mortgage is equal to

$$\bar{m} = \frac{i_m}{1-(1+i_m)^{-30}} B = 0.0803B,$$

where we assume $i_m = 0.0697$, as in the 2001 US data and a 30-year mortgage. In our model we set

$$r_m = (1-\tau)\, i_m - \pi = 0.025$$

to account for interest deductability and inflation. Here $\tau = 0.239$ is the average marginal tax rate in 2001 and $\pi = 0.028$ is the rate of inflation in that year. Hence the payment-to-income ratio in the model relative to that in the data is

$$\frac{\frac{1-(1+i_m)^{-D}}{i_m}}{\frac{1-(1+r_m)^{-D}}{r_m}(1-\tau)} = 0.7814,$$

where dividing by $1-\tau$ is necessary since income in the model is post-tax, while in the data it is pre-tax.

The median PTI for 2001 reported in Greenwald (2018) was 0.35. However, mortgage payments are only about 60% of all debt payments in the data. Banks compute the total PTI when a household applies for a mortgage loan, in order to reflect all outstanding debt. Assuming everyone has identical non-mortgage payments equal to a fraction λ of their income, then the mortgage payment are limited to a ratio $0.35 - \lambda$ of one's income. We calculate $\lambda = 0.0767$ as the ratio of non-mortgage payments to income in the 2001 SCF and therefore target a PTI ratio of 0.2733. Adjusting by the 0.7184 ratio above gives the 0.214 payment-to-income ratio used in the main text.

13 Alternative Parameterizations

We next report the full set of parameter values and moments used to calibrate the alternative model economies described in the main text. Since the income moments are based on a longer panel from 1999 to 2007, we keep the parameter values characterizing the income process unchanged in all these experiments.

13.1 Economy with $\nu = 1/10$

We report the parameter values and moments in Table A1.

13.2 Economy with $\nu = 0$

We report the parameter values and moments in Table A2.

13.3 2016 Calibration

We report the parameter values and moments in Table A3.

13.4 Constant Liquid Interest Rate

We report the parameter values and moments in Table A4. Note that the interest rate on liquid assets is constant here and equal to $r_h = 0.007$.

13.5 Moving Shocks

We report the parameter values and moments in Table A5.

13.6 No Home Production

We report the parameter values and moments in Table A6.

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Table A1: Economy with $\nu = 1/10$

A. Moments Used in Calibration

	Data	Model		Data	Model
variance log income	0.44	0.43	mean liquid assets	0.46	0.44
autocov log income 2 years	0.33	0.34	median liquid assets	0.07	0.08
autocov log income 4 years	0.31	0.31	mean liquid assets homeowners	0.53	0.65
std dev log income growth 2 years	0.41	0.41	median liquid assets homeowners	0.15	0.15
fraction homeowners	0.64	0.65	fraction hand-to-mouth	0.41	0.37
mean wealth	1.45	1.39	fraction hand-to-mouth homeowners	0.32	0.27
mean housing to income	1.82	1.75	90^{th} pct liquid assets homeowners	1.69	1.65
mean mortgage debt to income	0.83	0.81	mean wealth retirees to workers	2.00	2.01
fraction borrowers who extract	0.08	0.08			

B. Parameter Values

Assigned			*Calibrated*		
T	61	number of adult years	β	0.943	discount factor
σ	2	relative risk aversion	α	0.653	preference weight on housing
γ	1	home production elasticity	ϕ	0.932	efficiency home production
D	30	mortgage maturity	B	9.728	bequest motive
r_m	0.025	mortgage interest rate	R	0.046	rental rate of housing
θ_m	0.85	maximum LTV	$f_{0,m}$	2,590	fixed cost mortgage, 2016 USD
θ_y	0.21	maximum PTI	τ_0	0.300	slope liquid i-rate schedule
$f_{1,m}$	0.005	proportional cost mortgage	τ_1	9.512	location liquid i-rate schedule
ν	1/10	mean utility cost mortgage	r_h	0.017	upper bound liquid i-rate
f_s	0.06	cost of selling home	ρ_z	0.964	AR(1) persistent income comp.
π_δ	0.10	prob. maintenance shock	σ_z	0.150	volatility persistent income comp.
$\bar{\delta}$	0.063	size maintenance shock	σ_e	0.327	volatility transitory income comp.
r_l	-0.028	lower bound liquid i-rate			

Note: We scale the moments of the distribution of liquid assets, mortgage debt, wealth and housing by average annual income. A period in the model is equal to one quarter. All parameter values reported in Panel B are appropriately annualized.

Table A2: Economy with $\nu = 0$

A. Moments Used in Calibration

	Data	Model		Data	Model
variance log income	0.44	0.43	mean liquid assets	0.46	0.44
autocov log income 2 years	0.33	0.34	median liquid assets	0.07	0.08
autocov log income 4 years	0.31	0.31	mean liquid assets homeowners	0.53	0.65
std dev log income growth 2 years	0.41	0.41	median liquid assets homeowners	0.15	0.14
fraction homeowners	0.64	0.65	fraction hand-to-mouth	0.41	0.37
mean wealth	1.45	1.43	fraction hand-to-mouth homeowners	0.32	0.28
mean housing to income	1.82	1.78	90^{th} pct liquid assets homeowners	1.69	1.67
mean mortgage debt to income	0.83	0.80	mean wealth retirees to workers	2.00	2.01
fraction borrowers who extract	0.08	0.08			

B. Parameter Values

Assigned			*Calibrated*		
T	61	number of adult years	β	0.943	discount factor
σ	2	relative risk aversion	α	0.685	preference weight on housing
γ	1	home production elasticity	ϕ	0.881	efficiency home production
D	30	mortgage maturity	B	10.53	bequest motive
r_m	0.025	mortgage interest rate	R	0.046	rental rate of housing
θ_m	0.85	maximum LTV	$f_{0,m}$	3,580	fixed cost mortgage, 2016 USD
θ_y	0.21	maximum PTI	τ_0	0.273	slope liquid i-rate schedule
$f_{1,m}$	0.005	proportional cost mortgage	τ_1	8.911	location liquid i-rate schedule
ν	1/3	mean utility cost mortgage	r_h	0.018	upper bound liquid i-rate
f_s	0.06	cost of selling home	ρ_z	0.964	AR(1) persistent income comp.
π_δ	0.10	prob. maintenance shock	σ_z	0.150	volatility persistent income comp.
$\bar{\delta}$	0.063	size maintenance shock	σ_e	0.327	volatility transitory income comp.
r_l	-0.028	lower bound liquid i-rate			

Note: We scale the moments of the distribution of liquid assets, mortgage debt, wealth and housing by average annual income. A period in the model is equal to one quarter. All parameter values reported in Panel B are appropriately annualized.

Table A3: 2016 Calibration

A. Moments Used in Calibration

	Data	Model		Data	Model
variance log income	0.44	0.43	mean liquid assets	0.34	0.33
autocov log income 2 years	0.33	0.34	median liquid assets	0.03	0.05
autocov log income 4 years	0.31	0.31	mean liquid assets homeowners	0.43	0.50
std dev log income growth 2 years	0.41	0.41	median liquid assets homeowners	0.08	0.13
fraction homeowners	0.59	0.60	fraction hand-to-mouth	0.47	0.44
mean wealth	1.27	1.24	fraction hand-to-mouth homeowners	0.38	0.33
mean housing to income	1.86	1.80	90^{th} pct liquid assets homeowners	1.41	1.37
mean mortgage debt to income	0.92	0.89	mean wealth retirees to workers	2.28	2.16
fraction borrowers who extract	0.05	0.05	home production to consumption	0.23	0.34

B. Parameter Values

Assigned			*Calibrated*		
T	61	number of adult years	β	0.944	discount factor
σ	2	relative risk aversion	α	0.700	preference weight on housing
γ	1	home production elasticity	ϕ	1.349	efficiency home production
D	30	mortgage maturity	B	9.743	bequest motive
r_m	0.025	mortgage interest rate	R	0.049	rental rate of housing
θ_m	0.85	maximum LTV	$f_{0,m}$	5,400	fixed cost mortgage, 2016 USD
θ_y	0.21	maximum PTI	τ_0	0.594	slope liquid i-rate schedule
$f_{1,m}$	0.005	proportional cost mortgage	τ_1	7.052	location liquid i-rate schedule
ν	1/3	mean utility cost mortgage	r_h	0.012	upper bound liquid i-rate
f_s	0.06	cost of selling home	ρ_z	0.964	AR(1) persistent income comp.
π_δ	0.10	prob. maintenance shock	σ_z	0.150	volatility persistent income comp.
$\bar{\delta}$	0.063	size maintenance shock	σ_e	0.327	volatility transitory income comp.
r_l	-0.028	lower bound liquid i-rate			

Note: We scale the moments of the distribution of liquid assets, mortgage debt, wealth and housing by average annual income. A period in the model is equal to one quarter. All parameter values reported in Panel B are appropriately annualized.

Table A4: Constant Liquid Interest Rate

A. Moments Used in Calibration

	Data	Model		Data	Model
variance log income	0.44	0.43	mean liquid assets	0.46	0.43
autocov log income 2 years	0.33	0.34	median liquid assets	0.07	0.14
autocov log income 4 years	0.31	0.31	mean liquid assets homeowners	0.53	0.60
std dev log income growth 2 years	0.41	0.41	median liquid assets homeowners	0.15	0.25
fraction homeowners	0.64	0.64	fraction hand-to-mouth	0.41	0.26
mean wealth	1.45	1.40	fraction hand-to-mouth homeowners	0.32	0.17
mean housing to income	1.82	1.70	90^{th} pct liquid assets homeowners	1.69	1.30
mean mortgage debt to income	0.83	0.73	mean wealth retirees to workers	2.00	2.05
fraction borrowers who extract	0.08	0.07	home production to consumption	0.23	0.32

B. Parameter Values

Assigned			*Calibrated*		
T	61	number of adult years	β	0.952	discount factor
σ	2	relative risk aversion	α	0.475	preference weight on housing
γ	1	home production elasticity	ϕ	1.300	efficiency home production
D	30	mortgage maturity	B	12.84	bequest motive
r_m	0.025	mortgage interest rate	R	0.042	rental rate of housing
θ_m	0.85	maximum LTV	$f_{0,m}$	1,030	fixed cost mortgage, 2016 USD
θ_y	0.21	maximum PTI	τ_0	–	slope liquid i-rate schedule
$f_{1,m}$	0.005	proportional cost mortgage	τ_1	–	location liquid i-rate schedule
ν	1/3	mean utility cost mortgage	r_h	0.007	upper bound liquid i-rate
f_s	0.06	cost of selling home	ρ_z	0.964	AR(1) persistent income comp.
π_δ	0.10	prob. maintenance shock	σ_z	0.150	volatility persistent income comp.
$\bar{\delta}$	0.063	size maintenance shock	σ_e	0.327	volatility transitory income comp.
r_l	–	lower bound liquid i-rate			

Note: We scale the moments of the distribution of liquid assets, mortgage debt, wealth and housing by average annual income. A period in the model is equal to one quarter. All parameter values reported in Panel B are appropriately annualized.

Table A5: Moving Shocks

A. Moments Used in Calibration

	Data	Model		Data	Model
variance log income	0.44	0.43	mean liquid assets	0.46	0.48
autocov log income 2 years	0.33	0.34	median liquid assets	0.07	0.10
autocov log income 4 years	0.31	0.31	mean liquid assets homeowners	0.53	0.51
std dev log income growth 2 years	0.41	0.41	median liquid assets homeowners	0.15	0.11
fraction homeowners	0.64	0.65	fraction hand-to-mouth	0.41	0.34
mean wealth	1.45	1.37	fraction hand-to-mouth homeowners	0.32	0.32
mean housing to income	1.82	1.76	90^{th} pct liquid assets homeowners	1.69	1.64
mean mortgage debt to income	0.83	0.87	mean wealth retirees to workers	2.00	1.91
fraction borrowers who extract	0.08	0.08	home production to consumption	0.23	0.27

B. Parameter Values

Assigned			*Calibrated*		
T	61	number of adult years	β	0.945	discount factor
σ	2	relative risk aversion	α	0.793	preference weight on housing
γ	1	home production elasticity	ϕ	1.010	efficiency home production
D	30	mortgage maturity	B	10.30	bequest motive
r_m	0.025	mortgage interest rate	R	0.054	rental rate of housing
θ_m	0.85	maximum LTV	$f_{0,m}$	160	fixed cost mortgage, 2016 USD
θ_y	0.21	maximum PTI	τ_0	0.641	slope liquid i-rate schedule
$f_{1,m}$	0.005	proportional cost mortgage	τ_1	7.300	location liquid i-rate schedule
ν	1/3	mean utility cost mortgage	r_h	0.014	upper bound liquid i-rate
f_s	0.06	cost of selling home	ρ_z	0.964	AR(1) persistent income comp.
π_δ	0.10	prob. maintenance shock	σ_z	0.150	volatility persistent income comp.
$\bar{\delta}$	0.063	size maintenance shock	σ_e	0.327	volatility transitory income comp.
r_l	-0.028	lower bound liquid i-rate	$\pi_{r,r}$	0.653	probability staying renter
			$\pi_{h,r}$	0.044	probability moving

Note: We scale the moments of the distribution of liquid assets, mortgage debt, wealth and housing by average annual income. A period in the model is equal to one quarter. All parameter values reported in Panel B are appropriately annualized.

Table A6: No Home Production

A. Moments Used in Calibration

	Data	Model		Data	Model
variance log income	0.44	0.43	mean liquid assets	0.46	0.45
autocov log income 2 years	0.33	0.34	median liquid assets	0.07	0.14
autocov log income 4 years	0.31	0.31	mean liquid assets homeowners	0.53	0.62
std dev log income growth 2 years	0.41	0.41	median liquid assets homeowners	0.15	0.19
fraction homeowners	0.64	0.67	fraction hand-to-mouth	0.41	0.24
mean wealth	1.45	1.32	fraction hand-to-mouth homeowners	0.32	0.16
mean housing to income	1.82	1.71	90^{th} pct liquid assets homeowners	1.69	1.66
mean mortgage debt to income	0.83	0.84	mean wealth retirees to workers	2.00	2.06
fraction borrowers who extract	0.08	0.08			

B. Parameter Values

Assigned			*Calibrated*		
T	61	number of adult years	β	0.914	discount factor
σ	2	relative risk aversion	α	0.976	preference weight on housing
γ	1	home production elasticity	ϕ	0	efficiency home production
D	30	mortgage maturity	B	11.27	bequest motive
r_m	0.025	mortgage interest rate	R	0.048	rental rate of housing
θ_m	0.85	maximum LTV	$f_{0,m}$	990	fixed cost mortgage, 2016 USD
θ_y	0.21	maximum PTI	τ_0	0.371	slope liquid i-rate schedule
$f_{1,m}$	0.005	proportional cost mortgage	τ_1	11.37	location liquid i-rate schedule
ν	1/3	mean utility cost mortgage	r_h	0.021	upper bound liquid i-rate
f_s	0.06	cost of selling home	ρ_z	0.964	AR(1) persistent income comp.
π_δ	0.10	prob. maintenance shock	σ_z	0.150	volatility persistent income comp.
$\bar{\delta}$	0.063	size maintenance shock	σ_e	0.327	volatility transitory income comp.
r_l	-0.028	lower bound liquid i-rate			

Note: We scale the moments of the distribution of liquid assets, mortgage debt, wealth and housing by average annual income. A period in the model is equal to one quarter. All parameter values reported in Panel B are appropriately annualized.