Steffen Andersen

Department of Finance
Copenhagen Business School
Solbjerg Plads 3
DK-2000 Frederiksberg

Institutional Affiliation: Copenhagen Business School

NBER Working Papers and Publications

June 2020Gender Differences in Negotiation: Evidence from Real Estate Transactions
with Julie Marx, Kasper Meisner Nielsen, Lise Vesterlund: w27318
We investigate negotiations over real estate and find that men secure better prices than women when negotiating to buy and sell property. However, the gender difference declines substantially when improving controls for the property’s value; and is eliminated when controlling for unobserved heterogeneity in a sample of repeated sales. Rather than evidence of gender differences in negotiation, the initial difference in prices is evidence that men and women demand different properties. Consistently we find no gender difference in the sales price secured for property inherited from a deceased parent. Provided appropriate controls men and women fare equally well when negotiating over real estate. Our study demonstrates that inference on gender differences in negotiation relies critically on co...
July 2015Sources of Inaction in Household Finance: Evidence from the Danish Mortgage Market
with John Y. Campbell, Kasper Meisner Nielsen, Tarun Ramadorai: w21386
We build an empirical model to decompose delays in mortgage refinancing into time-dependent inaction (a low probability of responding to a refinancing incentive in a given quarter) and state- dependent inaction (a psychological addition to the financial cost of refinancing). We estimate the model on high-quality administrative panel data from Denmark, where mortgage refinancing without cash-out is unconstrained. Middle-aged and wealthy households exhibit state-dependent inaction; but older, poorer, and less-educated households exhibit strong time-dependent inaction and thereby achieve lower savings. We use the model to understand frictions in the mortgage channel of monetary policy transmission.
November 2014Toward an Understanding of Reference-Dependent Labor Supply: Theory and Evidence from a Field Experiment
with Alec Brandon, Uri Gneezy, John A. List: w20695
Perhaps the most powerful form of framing arises through reference dependence, wherein choices are made recognizing the starting point or a goal. In labor economics, for example, a form of reference dependence, income targeting, has been argued to represent a serious challenge to traditional economic models. We design a field experiment linked tightly to three popular economic models of labor supply—two behavioral variants and one simple neoclassical model—to deepen our understanding of the positive implications of our major theories. Consistent with neoclassical theory and reference-dependent preferences with endogenous reference points, workers (vendors in open air markets) supply more hours when presented with an expected transitory increase in hourly wages. In contrast with the predict...
October 2012Carrots that Look Like Sticks: Toward an Understanding of Multitasking Incentive Schemes
with Omar Al-Ubaydli, Uri Gneezy, John A. List: w18453
Constructing compensation schemes for effort in multi-dimensional tasks is complex, particularly when some dimensions are not easily observable. When incentive schemes contractually reward workers for easily observed measures, such as quantity produced, the standard model predicts that unrewarded dimensions, such as quality, will be neglected. Yet, there remains mixed empirical evidence in favor of this standard principal-agent model prediction. This paper reconciles the literature by using both theory and empirical evidence. The theory outlines conditions under which principals can use a piece rate scheme to induce higher quantity and quality levels than analogous fixed wage schemes. Making use of a series of complementary laboratory and field experiments we show that this effect occurs b...

Published: Omar Al-Ubaydli & Steffen Andersen & Uri Gneezy & John A. List, 2015. "Carrots That Look Like Sticks: Toward an Understanding of Multitasking Incentive Schemes," Southern Economic Journal, Southern Economic Association, vol. 81(3), pages 538-561, January. citation courtesy of

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