Department of Economics
University of Calgary
2500 University Drive NW
Calgary, AB, T2N 1N5
NBER Program Affiliations:
NBER Affiliation: Faculty Research Fellow
Institutional Affiliations: University of Calgary and CEPR
NBER Working Papers and Publications
|October 2018||Fatal Attraction? Extended Unemployment Benefits, Labor Force Exits, and Mortality|
with Andreas Kuhn, Jean-Philippe Wuellrich, Josef Zweimüller: w25124
We estimate the causal effect of permanent and premature exits from the labor force on mortality. To overcome the problem of negative health selection into early retirement, we exploit a policy change in unemployment insurance rules in Austria that allowed workers in eligible regions to exit the labor force 3 years earlier compared to workers in non-eligible regions. Using administrative data with precise information on mortality and retirement, we find that the policy change induced eligible workers to exit the labor force significantly earlier. Instrumental variable estimation results show that for men retiring one year earlier causes a 6.8% increase in the risk of premature death and 0.2 years reduction in the age at death, but has no significant effect for women.
Published: Andreas Kuhn & Stefan Staubli & Jean-Philippe Wuellrich & Josef Zweimüller, 2019. "Fatal attraction? Extended unemployment benefits, labor force exits, and mortality," Journal of Public Economics, .
|July 2018||Financial Incentives and Earnings of Disability Insurance Recipients: Evidence from a Notch Design|
with Philippe Ruh: w24830
Most countries reduce Disability Insurance (DI) benefits for beneficiaries earning above a specified threshold. Such an earnings threshold generates a discontinuous increase in tax liability—a notch—and creates an incentive to keep earnings below the threshold. Exploiting such a notch in Austria, we provide transparent and credible identification of the effect of financial incentives on DI beneficiaries’ earnings. Using rich administrative data, we document large and sharp bunching at the earnings threshold. However, the elasticity driving these responses is small. Our estimate suggests that relaxing the earnings threshold reduces fiscal cost only if program entry is very inelastic.
Published: Philippe Ruh & Stefan Staubli, 2019. "Financial Incentives and Earnings of Disability Insurance Recipients: Evidence from a Notch Design," American Economic Journal: Economic Policy, vol 11(2), pages 269-300.
|September 2017||The Accident Externality from Trucking|
with Lucija Muehlenbachs, Ziyan Chu: w23791
The presence of a heavy truck on the road can impose an externality if accidents occur that would not have otherwise. We find each additional truck on the road increases the risk of a truck accident—but also, at an even higher rate, the risk of a car-on-car collision. Our estimates imply two percent of all car-on-car collisions can be attributed to trucks on the road. This negative externality falls on all road users through higher car insurance premiums: one truck, driving for a year in the same zip code, increases the insurance premium of each new enrollee by $0.48/year.
|July 2016||Disability Benefit Generosity and Labor Force Withdrawal|
with Kathleen Mullen: w22419
A key component for estimating the optimal size and structure of disability insurance (DI) programs is the elasticity of DI claiming with respect to benefit generosity. Yet, in many countries, including the United States, all workers face identical benefit schedules, which are a function of one’s labor market history, making it difficult to separate the effect of the benefit level from the effect of unobserved preferences for work on individuals’ claiming decisions. To circumvent this problem, we exploit exogenous variation in DI benefits in Austria arising from several reforms to its DI and old age pension system in the 1990s and 2000s. We use comprehensive administrative social security records data on the universe of Austrian workers to compute benefit levels under six different regimes...
Published: Mullen, Kathleen J. & Staubli, Stefan, 2016. "Disability benefit generosity and labor force withdrawal," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 143(C), pages 49-63. citation courtesy of