The Effect of Relabeling and Incentives on Retirement: Evidence from a Pension Reform


Investigators: Jonathan Gruber (MIT and NBER), Ohto Kanninen (Finland, Labor Institute for Economic Research)

A common approach for Social Security systems around the world to address their fiscal shortfalls is to change retirement ages. Separating the financial incentives associated with the age changes from their impacts on retirement norms is difficult, but a reform in Finland allows us to do so. Before 2005, retirees in Finland qualified for “early” retirement at age 60, with “normal” retirement at age 65. In 2005, a new “flexible” retirement age was introduced at age 63. While the reform also included changes in financial incentives, these changes were both modest and more continuous across cohorts than was this “relabeling,” allowing us to separate the two. This project is a careful empirical analysis of the Finland reform.

Labor force participation
Communication and behavior
Social Security

Papers funded by this Project: